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IN THEIR VERY THOUGHTFUL and stimulating replies,the three commentators foreground severaltopics crucial for both psychoanalysis and
philosophical psychiatry. In my short response, I
focus primarily on what the commentators be-
lieve to be the paper’s main shortcomings. The
first critique reads as follows: Freud never claimed
that the Homo sapiens is a fundamentally sick
animal, but in fact thought that normalcy is
possible and that normal behavior need not be
interpreted as neurotic, perverse or psychotic.
The second is that current Darwinian psychiatry
does not substantiate the view that Homo sapi-
ens is essentially an ill animal, whatever Freud’s
position might be. Third and last, the proposal
that all human beings are ill to the core seems to
be more of a religious slogan than a scientifically
useful description.
What Freud Really Said
A transhistorical approach to Freud’s work is
far from simple, considering that it spans a peri-
od of over forty years and that it underwent
considerable changes during that time. Not only
did Freud introduce some radically new concepts
during that time, such as narcissism and the
death drive. Also, he regularly changed his posi-
tion on the aim of psychoanalytic therapy, the
ontogenesis of anxiety, and the nature of human
sexuality. That Freud sometimes saw homosexu-
ality as an inborn drive did not keep him on
other occasions from thinking that homosexual
desire was a result of the repression or projection
of an oedipal (heterosexual) drive. Examples like
these show that any exegesis of Freud’s writings
inevitably has to deal with some tensions. Freud’s
work contains numerous apparent, as well as
real, contradictions, so that it is no surprise at all
that Katherine Morris can produce textual evi-
dence “proving” that Freud never held the view I
attribute to him. According to her, Freud thought
that we are not all neurotics and that normalcy is
possible.
I do not deny that several passages in Freud’s
work underscore the possibility of non-neurotic
normalcy. Indeed, Freudian theory even describes
processes—sublimation, the transformation from
Id to Ego, the resolution of the oedipal complex,
among others—that explain how human beings
can escape neurosis and other mental disorders.
But Freud’s illustrations of these mechanisms or
processes make clear that he could not conceive
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of a nonpathogenic psychodynamics. Consider,
for instance, how Freud emphasizes throughout
his study of Leonardo da Vinci that Leonardo’s
sublimations make him extremely vulnerable to
psychic exhaustion or “neurasthenia” (1910).
Freud never tires of repeating that there is only a
gradual difference between a neurotic patient
and Leonardo da Vinci, the sublimating
(“healthy”) artist and scientist.
Morris (2005) is right, of course, in arguing
that a gradual difference between normality and
mental illness does not imply that there is no
difference at all. Quantity should not be thought
the opposite of quality, because small quantita-
tive differences can transform an “articulation”
into a “breach.” To use Hegel’s famous example,
there is a continuum between 110° C and -10° C,
but everybody knows that that water evaporates
above 100° C and freezes below 0° C. Applied to
mental disorders, quantitative differences in lev-
els of testosterone and serotonin may lead to
qualitative differences in behavior; in other words,
categorical and dimensional approaches to men-
tal illnesses are not mutually exclusive. Having
established that, we now need to take a closer
look at how Freud articulated the differences
between seemingly normal individuals and the
mentally ill.
Freud held that neurosis, psychosis, and per-
version are caused by the interplay between in-
stincts and defense mechanisms. Further, he
thought that the pathogenic instincts were al-
most exclusively sexual. Now, although it is true
that he sometimes recognized that the fear of
death and the death drive are important factors
for psychic life (Deeley 2005) and for the etiolo-
gy of psychosis, more often than not he inter-
preted the fear of death as a symbolization of
castration anxiety (Freud 1926). And although
the death drive might account for numerous phe-
nomena, its most instinctual expression has al-
ways been masochism (Freud 1924).
Masochism and other sexual instincts must be
warded off because their unmodified gratifica-
tion would be dangerous. However, the defenses
against the sexual drives are far from innocent
themselves: they cause neurosis because they pro-
duce more suffering than strictly necessary. “Nor-
mal individuals” and neurotics are not substan-
tially different: they both have the same sexual
instincts, and they both use the same defenses
against those instincts, although these defenses
are all equally inadequate in warding off the
sexual dangers. “Freudian” slips do not merely
resemble neurotic symptoms, they are neurotic
symptoms, just as dreams are psychotic symp-
toms. Freud was well aware that the “normal
individual” suffers less than the neurotic and the
psychotic patient, but that never led him to re-
vise his basic intuition that every defense against
our innate sexual drives is inadequate. Freud
would probably agree that “many of us can spend
much of our life in contented fulfillment” (Dee-
ley 2005, 340), but he would nevertheless still
uphold the view that unnecessary suffering is
inevitable for human beings.
One might object and say that sexuality as
such is not pathogenic. Unaided by civilization,
“human nature” would never have produced neu-
rosis (Morris 2005). In the absence of (internal-
ized) cultural restrictions on instinctual life, de-
fense mechanisms such as repression would be
redundant and the majority of the people could,
and would, be healthy. This may be plausible,
but it is not Freud’s view. Freud believed that
sexual drives are repressed when their gratifica-
tion causes more pain than pleasure, which is to
say that cultural taboos on sexuality are liable to
increase the dangers of sexual activities. Be that
as it may, Freud always insisted that there are
more fundamental motives for the repression of
our sexuality (Geyskens 2001), that, in the end,
people repress their oedipal, sadistic, coprophilic
tendencies for biological rather than for cultural
reasons (Freud 1912, 1919). Human anatomy,
the double beginning of human sexuality, and
human bisexuality make our sexual instincts ab-
solutely unsatisfiable. In Civilization and its Dis-
contents, Freud even suggests that the biological
factors causing neurosis were likewise responsi-
ble for hominid speciation:
With the assumption of an erect posture by man and
with the depreciation of his sense of smell, it was not
only his anal erotism which threatened to fall victim
to organic repression, but the whole of his sexuality;
so that since this, the sexual function has been accom-
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panied by a repugnance which cannot further be ac-
counted for, and which prevents its complete satisfac-
tion and forces it away from the sexual aim. (Freud
1930, 99)
Upright posture, human bisexuality, and other
“typically human traits” all make it quite unlike-
ly that our sexuality would be well-adapted to
any environment whatsoever. What makes us
human makes us mentally ill, regardless of the
culture we are part of. Consequently, typically
human activities should be interpreted first and
foremost in psychiatric terms. It is interesting, in
this respect, to note that both examples from
psychoanalytic philosophy discussed by Hinshel-
wood originate in an analysis of dysfunctional
phenomena (Hinshelwood 2005): Waddington’s
natural ethics relied heavily on an investigation
of pathological morals and Bion’s epistemology
focused primarily on the rather dramatic failure
of the alpha function in schizophrenic patients.
Psychoanalysts are convinced that the psychi-
atric clinic is the privileged birthplace of theories
about human nature, and Freud even thought
that Darwin’s theory of evolution lent credence
to this conviction. In particular, he believed that
evolutionary theory could explain why we are all
ill to the core.
Taking Freud Seriously
Darwin relied on Crichton Browne’s observa-
tions about the Wakefield asylum to provide the
solid foundation for his theory about the expres-
sion of the emotions (Darwin 1872/1998; Neve
and Turner 1995). Still, even if Darwin also saw
the psychiatric clinic as some kind of anthropo-
logical lab, he did not for all that hold the view
that all human beings are mentally disordered by
nature. Freud, in other words, had to develop his
own Darwinian or evolutionary psychiatry, which
he did, though unfortunately, more along Lama-
rckian and Haeckelian than Darwinian lines. This
being the case, can neo-Darwinian theory provide
a solid foundation for a Freudian philosophy?
To answer that question, we first have to de-
fine just how “Freudian” this philosophy has to
be. In my opinion, such a philosophy would have
to emphasize (1) the dysfunctional nature of
Homo sapiens and (2) the psychodynamic origin
of this fundamental dysfunction. That is, a Freud-
ian philosophy is Freudian enough if it holds that
(1) we are all mad and (2) this unavoidable
sickness is due to inappropriate solutions for
intrapsychic conflicts. Whether or not these con-
flicts originate in sexual instincts is less impor-
tant for the Freudian character of this philoso-
phy. After all, Freud’s own definition of sexuality
was broad enough to encompass nearly all hu-
man desires, attitudes, and activities, including
love, curiosity, art, and even philosophy.
There are some evolutionary researchers who
have studied unavoidable intrapsychic conflicts.
MacLean’s triune brain hypothesis, for instance,
can be seen as an attempt to explain our species’
vulnerability to mental disorders. Particularly in
Homo sapiens, the neo-mammalian brain (neo-
cortex) is not immune to being hijacked by the
reptilian and paleo-mammalian brains (MacLean
1985). That said, it is also true that the triune
brain hypothesis cannot be used as an evolution-
ary foundation for the Freudian project, if for no
other reason than because MacLean’s model is
inconsistent with more recent understandings of
evolutionary change (Butler and Hodos 1996).
The commentators (Deeley 2005; Morris 2005)
correctly point out that the often-used genome
lag model is likewise not fruitful to the articula-
tion of a Freudian philosophy, because it implies
that modern disorders were adaptations in the
environment of evolutionary adaptedness and
that they are still adaptive in any other environ-
ment sufficiently similar to the environment of
evolutionary adaptedness.
In short, it is by no means easy to provide
Freudian philosophy with an evolutionary foun-
dation; still, I do not believe that it is completely
impossible. Two potential topics of research can
help to substantiate this belief. I already men-
tioned the first topic in my paper, where I sketch
out the possibility that there is an essentially
pathogenic interplay between metaphysical or
existential problems and our naturally selected
defenses. Our defenses may be triggered by meta-
physical problems because these problems re-
semble “natural problems.” Freezing is adaptive
when a predator is chasing you, but it is highly
unlikely that it can help one to escape God’s
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judgment, or mortality, or life’s futility. Howev-
er, because attacks by a predator and metaphysi-
cal problems are both experienced as situations
of imminent doom, the freezing defense can be
triggered in both cases (Moskowitz 2004); it is a
very inappropriate defense against the metaphys-
ical problems, because it creates more problems
than it solves (Vieira 1972). In broad terms, this
means that our evolved metaphysical nature can
and will corrupt our evolved defenses.
Mithen’s evolutionary archaeology provides a
second point of departure for a Freudian philos-
ophy. Mithen argues that the cultural “big bang”
of the Middle/Upper Paleolithic transition (new
types of artifacts, the production of art, the rise
of religion) was caused by a fundamental rede-
sign of the mind (Mithen 1996); cognitive fluidi-
ty is the name Mithen gives to the result of this
redesign. Originally, the early hominid brain con-
sisted of several domain-specific modules, all of
which were the result of natural, sexual and
social selection. Each of these modules was “en-
capsulated.” Around the time of the Middle/
Upper Paleolithic transition, however, some of
the modules became applicable to problems that
fell outside of their proper domain. Art, for in-
stance, resulted from the mixture of a technical
intelligence, a verbal intelligence, and the trace-
decoding part of our natural history intelligence.
Mithen describes cognitive fluidity as an adapta-
tion, and he argues that it had tremendous ad-
vantages for hunting and social communication.
He admits, however, that “transmodular creativ-
ity” or cognitive fluidity may have had some less
advantageous and less adaptive consequences.
Racism, he speculates, could be a side-effect of
our (evolved) capacity to cross the boundaries of
our (evolved) modules (Mithen 1996, 196). At
the very least, racism can be understood as re-
sulting from the use of natural history categories
in a social context. Following this line of thought,
it does not seem too far-fetched to argue that
such misappropriations or “category mistakes”
are inevitable side-effects of those adaptations
that make us human. And it could be that some
typically human mental disorders should be seen
as just such category mistakes. Can one not ar-
gue, for instance, that all human sexuality is
intrinsically perverted because it had selective
advantages to use sexuality as a solution for non-
sexual problems? Although most of the time the
“transmodular use” of sexuality will benefit the
individual’s inclusive fitness, less advantageous
applications of our sexuality are unavoidable.
John Money has argued something similar with
regard to pedophilia, which he sees as the result
of the misuse of our sexual “phylism”—his term
for a phylogenetically acquired tendency—in a
context of social contact and care. Such misuse is
relatively common because of a functional prox-
imity between sexual and social “phylisms”
(Money 1997).
A Darwinian Religion?
Rychlak (1990) argues that a large part of
psychoanalysis is profoundly idiographic and in-
trospectic, that psychoanalytic theory emphasiz-
es the uniqueness of personality manifestation
and that it bases its interpretations on the first
person perspective. Conversely, most sciences are
profoundly nomothetic and extraspective: they
stick to a third-person perspective and construct
abstractions or even “laws.” Most psychoanalyt-
ic theorists have tried to bridge the gap between
their idiographic discourse and other, more no-
mothetic discourses. They called this bridge meta-
psychology. Although, as I have argued, Freud’s
metapsychology is partially based on evolution-
ary theory, another part of it is inspired by litera-
ture, mythology, and metaphysics—consider those
key concepts of psychoanalysis, the Oedipus com-
plex and narcissism. Freud no doubt believed
that psychoanalysis needed science to ensure its
credibility, but he also believed that it needed
myths as a heuristic framework. Sometimes this
double cornerstone of psychoanalytic theory led
to an awkward mixture of science and mytholo-
gy, as in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where
Freud took arguments from evolutionary theory,
genetics (Weissman), metaphysics (Empedocles),
and literature (Goethe) to justify the introduc-
tion of the death drive (Freud 1920).
Some deplore the confusion of science and
myth, but Freud himself did not seem to bother.
He even wrote that “[d]rive theory is our my-
thology” (Freud 1933, 95). Like many of his
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contemporaries, Freud also believed that science
was only possible when inspired by some general
ideas that furnish a method and means of expla-
nation. And these general ideas are the work of
philosophers, writers, and religious thinkers, all
of whom need a metaphysical scaffolding to con-
ceive such ideas (Ellenberger 1970). So it can be
no surprise that Freud’s psychoanalytic metapsy-
chology has a lot in common with religious and
metaphysical systems, as Deeley notes. True, this
may cause “a persistent ambiguity about the
factual or scientific status of psychoanalytic the-
ory itself” (Deeley 2005, XX), but this ambiguity
might just be the very reason why a philosophi-
cal system can emerge from psychoanalytic theo-
ry. The claim that all humans are ill to the core
smacks of religion and theology. But Freud’s the-
sis is founded on a psychoanalytic account that
provides the proximate causes for Homo sapi-
ens’ dysfunctional nature, whereas evolutionary
theory gives the ultimate causes of the same. As
much as Freud’s thesis may sound like a religious
slogan (Doomed by Nature), it is in fact a theo-
ry-laden description. I have tried to argue that
this description can be used as an heuristic device
for philosophical anthropology, that it provides
a starting point for a philosophical theory of
human nature in which different pathological
variants are understood or interpreted as intrin-
sic possibilities of human existence.
Freud’s choice to link his metapsychology to
evolutionary theory was probably determined by
historical as well as by other, extra-theoretical
factors, such as the fact that Darwinian ideas
played an overwhelming role in the cultural and
scientific life of the early twentieth century (El-
lenberger 1970). But there is also no lack of
good, intra-theoretical reasons for linking Freud’s
philosophical thesis to evolutionary theory. First,
a naïve interpretation of evolutionary theory sees
all organisms as being extremely fit, so that Dar-
win’s widely accepted theory appears to contra-
dict Freud’s claim that all human beings are to
some degree mentally disordered. If you can ar-
gue that this apparent enemy is in fact on your
side—or at least that Darwinism does not ex-
clude the feasibility of your project—you gain
thereby both scientific and philosophical credi-
bility. Second, a philosophical anthropology
should never ignore the nature in “human na-
ture”; that is, every philosophical account of
what it means to be human has to acknowledge
the biological forces that drive us. And because
“nothing in biology makes sense except in the
light of evolution” (Dobzansky 1973, 125), Dar-
winism should be one of the privileged scientific
sources for philosophical anthropology. Simpson
may have overstated his case when he wrote:
“The question ‘What is man?’ is probably the
most profound that can be asked by man. It has
always been central to any system of philosophy
or of theology. The point I want to make now is
that all attempts to answer that question before
1859 are worthless and that we will be better off
if we ignore them completely” (Simpson 1966,
152). But I do think that any philosophical an-
thropology that ignores Darwinism is seriously
flawed.
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